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THE HUMAN MOMENT OF THE SOUL
LORENZO BARTOLUCCI, Stanford University

This article explores the idea of the soul through the framework of two of the
most elusive terms in Dante’s Commedia, “umano” and “persona.” It begins
with an analysis of the soul’s formation, outlined in Purgatorio 25, by way of
the conjunction of corporeal matter and a supernal “spirito novo,” which after
death seems to ascend beyond the realm of human existence. This account is
then contrasted with the etymological and theological affordances of the concept of personhood, which frames the body as the form—the “mask” of flesh
and bones—that continues to individuate the soul after death, immortalizing
rather than transcending the human moment of its origin. From the examination of these disparities emerges a new perspective on Dante’s conception of
human existence, illustrating its complex but fundamental place within the
idea of perfection at the heart of his poetic universe.
Keywords: Dante Alighieri, Body, Human, Perfection, Person, Self, Soul

Che la vera poesia abbia sempre il carattere
di un dono e che pertanto essa presupponga
la dignità di chi lo riceve, questo è forse il
maggior insegnamento che Dante ci abbia
lasciato.
—Eugenio Montale

1. Introduction
What is the soul? The ways in which medieval thinkers were able
to raise this question—the difference, as Mikko Yrjönsuuri recently
put it, “between the soul being a form and a thing”—continue to
command attention, and even a touch of yearning: “Can we, as
people of the third Millennium, learn something from such discussions?”1 There is an enduringly suggestive quality about the prospect of an epistemological “consensus” not yet “haunted by the
Mikko Yrjönsuuri, “The Soul as an Entity: Dante, Aquinas, Olivi,” in Forming the
Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to
the Medical Enlightenment, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 591

92, 60.
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specter of Cartesian dualism,” in Peter King’s phrase, and still at
home in the epigrammatic conciseness of the Augustinian vision of
human nature as “a rational substance consisting of soul and body.”2
At the same time, such suggestiveness implicates a number of “puzzling” philosophical questions that, to this day, remain unresolved,
beginning with the qualification St. Augustine himself appended to
his formulation: “But even if we so define man as to say: ‘Man is a
rational substance consisting of soul and body,’ there is no doubt
that man has a soul which is not body, and a body which is not
soul.”3
What does this mean? If there is no doubt that body and soul
are not to be mistaken for the same thing, how exactly are we then
to think of their unity—their consubstantiality? This contention
marks the outline of an imaginative blind spot where Dante continues to light the way. Chronicling his own endeavor to find an
orientation with respect to these issues—the nature of the soul and
its connection with bodily existence—his works lay down a path
of words and images, along which the questions that still “puzzle”
philosophers turn into so many pieces of a poetic vision reaching
into the ineffable recesses of what we are.4 This article will trace a
course along that path, in order to identify some of the insights that
such a vision still has to offer in the third millennium.
The interest of Dante’s view of the soul, of course, owes as
much to the creative as to the philosophical terms of his approach.
A crucial result of his writings was the consolidation of a speculative
vocabulary that Italian did not yet fully possess, with an eye to enabling the existence and enhancing the expressiveness of a vernacular philosophical discourse, rather than safeguarding the orthodoxy of its individual assertions. For this reason, alongside genealogies of Dante’s doctrinal affiliations,5 it seems wise to highlight the
Peter King, “Body and Soul,” in The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy,
ed. John Marenbon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 505-24, 505.
3
King, “Body and Soul,” 506; Augustine, De Trinitate 15.7.11 [trans. from On the
Trinity: Books 8-15, ed. Gareth B. Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002)].
4
King, for example, still commits to Duns Scotus’s version of the theory of hylomorphic compounds as the “apex” of the Augustinian vision of consubstantial unity.
Jérôme Baschet, by contrast, frames the relationship of soul and body as one of “dynamic dualism” (“Âme et corps dans l'occident médiéval: Une dualité dynamique,
entre pluralité et dualisme,” Archives de sciences sociales des religions 112 (2000): 530). An essential study of the peculiarity of Dante’s approach remains Robert Hollander’s “Dante Theologus-Poeta,” Dante Studies 94 (1976): 91-136 (repr. in Dante
Studies, with the Annual Report of the Dante Society 118 (2000): 261-302).
5
From Giovanni Busnelli and Giuseppe Vandelli’s analysis of his debt to Aquinian
Scholasticism (Dante, Il Convivio, 2 vols., eds. Giovanni Busnelli and Giuseppe Vandelli (Firenze: Le Monnier, 1964)) to Bruno Nardi’s vindication of the influence of
2
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syncretic and heterogenous character of his relationship to his
sources, as Cesare Vasoli remarked in the context of the Convivio:
“After all… it is still a book that endeavors, in every sense, to ‘divulge’ philosophical knowledge by using a language that does not
yet have its own speculative ‘vocabulary’!”6 Dante’s nascent vocabulary, in other words, provides a unique framework to chart the
contours and the development of his speculative insight. The semantic vicissitudes and oscillations of particular terms disclose a
window into the process of linguistic stabilization, wherein the
work of the poet’s imagination created and deployed the terms of
a novel philosophical attitude. And the question of the soul’s relationship to the body lies at the very center of this creative process.
The salience of this issue for Dante is well-documented by
the Convivio, where the variety of meanings the word “soul” (“anima”) takes on testifies to the complexity of its incorporation into
his speculative register. When it comes up in the first Canzone (“Io
vi dirò del cor la novitate / come l’anima trista piange in lui, / e
come un spirto contra lei favella…” vv. 10-137) Dante rapidly clarifies that “soul” is here used as a metonymy for the strength with
which Beatrice’s “memory” holds sway over his heart (2.6.8). In
Book 3, however, the same word becomes a synonym for the loving “affection” (“la mia anima, cioè lo mio affetto,” 3.3.14) that
fails to express itself into words; and in Book 4 it characterizes the
five vowels as the essence, “the soul and the tie,” of words and
language itself (“cinque vocali, che sono anima e legame d’ogni
parole,” 4.6.3). There are places where such denotative freedom
famously seems to bring the discourse of the Convivio on the verge
of dualism (“In prima è da sapere che l’uomo è composto d’anima
Albert the Great (see esp. Saggi di filosofia dantesca (Firenze: La Nuova Italia Editrice,
1967)) and John Freccero’s emphasis on the Augustinian nexus of linguistic and bodily
signification (Dante: The Poetics of Conversion, ed. Rachel Jacoff (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1986)), to mention just a few.
6
My trans. from Vasoli’s commentary to his edition of the Convivio: “E, del resto, il
Convivio è pur sempre un libro che si propone, in ogni senso, di ‘divulgare’ la sapienza filosofica, usando una lingua che non ha ancora un proprio ‘lessico’ speculativo!” (in Dante, Opere minori, Tomo I, Parte II, eds. Cesare Vasoli and Domenico
de Robertis (Milano: Ricciardi, 1988), 307). Vasoli helpfully anchors the point in
Kenelm Foster’s argument that Dante was “ben più preoccupato di proclamare la
nobiltà e la bellezza della vita intellettuale, che non di analizzarne partitamente la
natura” (“Tommaso d’Aquino,” in Enciclopedia Dantesca, 6 vols., ed. Umberto
Bosco (Roma: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1970)). See also Marianne Shapiro’s
study of the Dantean body as the “knot” of an unstable ontology, Dante and the Knot
of Body and Soul (London: Macmillan, 1998).
7
All passages from the Convivio are quoted from Vasoli’s edition. Translations of
particular terms and phrases are based on Il Convivio (The Banquet), trans. Richard
H. Lansing (New York: Garland Library of Medieval Literature, 1990).
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e di corpo,” 4.21.2), and it eventually lays bare the full scope of
Dante’s ambivalence about the soul’s nature in the form of a seemingly irreconcilable assertion, namely that the “human” soul (“l’anima umana, che è forma nobilissima di queste che sotto lo cielo
sono generate,” 3.2.6), following death, “endures perpetually in a
nature which is more than human” (“ché [l’anima poi che è] partita, perpetualmente dura in natura più che umana,” 2.8.6).
We may look on this ambivalence as Dante’s version of the
blind spot highlighted earlier in the Augustinian definition of human nature.8 Paul Dumol has underlined the untenable “implications of superiority,” for instance, that seem to accompany the idea
of a soul ascending beyond the realm of the human—a soul that in
the final analysis, therefore, would hardly seem to be human at all.9
Vis à vis exegetical fixes of this kind, the Commedia is generally
accorded the final word as a moment of reckoning, correction, and
self-refutation, giving Dante an opportunity to revisit contradictions from his earlier work. Over the course of this article, however, I will argue that with respect to the nature of the soul, the
Commedia stages the exact opposite move: not a refutation, that is,
but a radicalization of the imaginative paradox involved in the unity
between the immortal existence of the soul and its mortal human
origin.10 Analyzed in the context of the process of stabilization
Terms like “ambivalence” and “paradox” (further in this paragraph) may appear at
odds with the idea of the rational soul as the “incorporeal and subsistent principle”
that survives the body after death (Aquinas, Summa theologiæ 1a.75.2, trans. from
Man (1a.75-83), ed. and trans. Timothy Suttor, vol. 11 of Summa Theologiæ, 60
vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); see also Quæstiones disputatæ
de anima 14, and Aristotle’s De anima 1.4.408b18-30, 2.2.413b25-27, 3.4.429b5),
which clearly underlies that of a soul enduring “in natura più che umana.” While the
Scholastic argumentation accounts for Dante’s understanding of the soul’s survival
after death, however, it also discloses a space for imaginative inquiry—that is to say,
for the exploration of the soul’s connection to the embodied dimension of existence
it must eventually return to, which Dante takes up in the Commedia. In the context
of this exploration, the question of the nature of human existence with respect to its
“incorporeal and subsistent principle” becomes salient precisely because it faces the
poet with an imaginative (if not doctrinal) paradox.
9
Paul A. Dumol, “Soul,” in The Dante Encyclopedia, ed. Richard H. Lansing (New
York: Routledge, 2010).
10
The notion of immortality must be clearly positioned with respect to the NeoAristotelian tradition, particularly in regard to two potential objections: that immortality, in the context of that tradition, is more properly characterized as a possibility,
rather than the premise, of the soul’s existence; and that it is circumscribed to the
intellect, the soul’s highest faculty—a claim frequently linked to Dante’s specific reference to “our intellect,” as distinct from “memory,” undertaking the journey towards God (“perché appressando sé al suo disire, / nostro intelletto si profonda tanto,
/ che dietro la memoria non può ire,” Par. 1.7-9). The latter interpretation becomes
less restrictive when we consider the wide range of connotations the term “intellect”
8
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unfolding through Dante’s vernacular terminology, in fact, the
poem’s investigation of this paradox sheds a suggestive new light
on one of the most “puzzling” questions that its age, indeed, has
bequeathed to us: What exactly does it mean for the soul—and
therefore for us—to be human?11
accommodates (see Cesare Vasoli, “intelletto,” in Enciclopedia Dantesca, for a detailed review of doctrinal and literary usages) and that Dante’s principal theological
sources agreed on the intellect’s consubstantiality with and privileged participation of
God’s divine nature (and so did Dante, of course, as discussed later in the analysis of
Purg. 25), but not on its ultimate separation from the soul’s other faculties and embodied existence (in addition to Augustine’s passage referenced earlier, see Aquinas’s
definition of personhood discussed later in this article, as well as his more extensive
argument in De unitate intellectus contra averroistas (esp. 1.25-26: “Most clearly
therefore it appears without any doubt… that the intellect is something belonging to
the soul which is the act of the body,” trans. from On the Unity of the Intellect
Against the Averroists, ed. and trans. Beatrice H. Zedler (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette
University Press, 1968)) and Richard of St. Victor’s description of the mind’s return
to the body after its mystical conjunction with God (De gratia contemplationis 6.23)).
Dante’s reference to “our intellect” as the faculty enabling or even properly undertaking the journey towards God, therefore, does not imply its exclusive immortality
after death. As we will see, in fact, Dante’s meticulous exploration of the soul as an
entity gathering in itself “e l’umano e ’l divino” (Purg. 25.81), combined with his
emphasis on the corporeality of souls in the afterlife, strongly suggests the opposite.
Likewise, the fact that all his encounters with individual souls—damned, penitent,
and blessed—undergird different facets of that exploration also restricts the purview
of the first objection to the realm of Dante’s philosophical background, rather than
doctrinal commitments made in the poem.
11
The question naturally needs to be situated with respect to one of Dante’s most
famous neologisms, “trasumanare”: “Trasumanar significar per verba / non si poria;
però l’essemplo basti / a cui esperïenza grazia serba” (Par. 1.70-72). Reading this
tercet as an indication that every soul returning to God ascends permanently “beyond
the human,” in fact, would invalidate any inquiry into human aspects of Dante’s conception of immortality. There are at least three reasons, however, to call such a reading into question. It is crucial to remember, first of all, that Dante does not coin the
term “trasumanare” to make an ontological statement, but to describe how he felt at
a very specific moment, looking at Beatrice while she was turned toward the heavenly
spheres (“Beatrice tutta ne l’etterne rote / fissa con li occhi stava; e io in lei / le luci
fissi, di là sù rimote,” Par. 1.64-66). The word, therefore, does not so much fix a state
of being as capture an experience defined by its extraordinarily liminal quality (as
highlighted by the very nature of the neologism, only used as a verb and rooted in a
prefix underscoring the “transient” character of the action, rather than its conclusiveness), the experience of a human being absorbed in contemplation of the divine. In
the second place, indeed, while warning that such an experience cannot be described
directly (“significar per verba / non si poria”), Dante also compares it to an example
(“però l’essemplo basti”) that foregrounds precisely that liminality, the story of Glaucus’s transformation into a sea-god: “Nel suo aspetto tal dentro mi fei, / qual si fé
Glauco nel gustar de l’erba / che ’l fé consorto in mar de li altri dèi” (Par. 1.67-69).
It may be tempting to read “consorto… de li altri dèi” as an allusion to the soul’s
definitive passage beyond the human realm; yet in Ovid’s version of the myth, which
Dante drew from, it is not by following the example of gods that Glaucus ends up
tasting the magical herb, but that of the fish he has caught (Metamorphoses 13.936-
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The soul, the poet Statius explains in Purgatorio 25:
Quando Lachesìs non ha più del lino,
solvesi da la carne, e in virtute
ne porta seco e l’umano e ’l divino. (Purg. 25.79-81)12

What exactly does it mean for this “human” aspect, so clearly distinct, to be also so perfectly conjoined with the divine, “more than
human” dimension of immortality? This concern will take us to the
heart of Dante’s exploration of the nature of the soul, guided by
two of the most prominent and elusive words in his poetic vocabulary, “umano” and “persona.” The contrasts and the synergy between these two terms, as we will see, animate a dovetailing vision
of human existence as the moment in which the soul attains its
eternal individual form: a vision of mortality, that is to say, as the
form of immortality itself.13 And what the soul’s human origin
39: “My catch, on touching the grass, began to stir, then to turn over and to move
about on land as in the sea. And while I paused in wonder they all slipped down into
their native waters, abandoning their new master and the shore,” trans. from Metamorphoses, Volume II: Books 9-15., trans. Frank Justus Miller, Loeb Classical Library
43 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1958): the (pagan, it is worth recalling) divinity Glaucus ascends to, in other words, represents not a passage, but an
intermediate status (an incarnated “transience”) between human and marine worlds
(commentators have remarked how subtly “trasumanare,” incidentally, underlines
that the comparison with Glaucus constitutes a “transumptio,” the layered metaphorical procedure at the foundation of Dante’s allegory (see Robert Durling’s note to his
translation of Par. 1.70, as well as Franscesco Tateo, “transumptio,” in Enciclopedia
Dantesca)). In the third place, just as “trasumanare” evokes Dante’s memory of what
it feels like to “go beyond the human,” so the very effort to match his poem’s human
language, by way of this neologism, to the peculiarity and the intensity of that experience testifies to the latter’s importance for the enrichment of human existence—an
existence which has been vertiginously elevated, and even transformed, but not obliterated by that instant in contemplation of Beatrice’s eyes raised to the heavenly
spheres (see Maurizio Dardano, “trasumanare,” in Enciclopedia Dantesca, for similar
examples of such experiential synthesis in the language of Paradiso), reinforcing rather
than foreclosing the notion of the soul’s enduring humanity.
12
All passages from the Commedia are quoted from Petrocchi’s edition (La Divina
Commedia, 3 vols, ed. Giorgio Petrocchi (Milano: Mondadori, 1994)). Translations
of particular terms and phrases are based on The Divine Comedy of Dante Alighieri,
3 vols., ed. and trans. Robert Durling (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997-2011),
in reason of its adherence to philological and philosophical nuances despite divergences of lineation.
13
It is important to emphasize the difference between Dante’s imaginative exploration
of the soul’s individuation, which this article examines, and the conceptual underpinnings of that exploration, which have already been extensively accounted for among
Dante’s philosophical sources (all the way to Aristotle’s definition of the soul as “the
cause and principle of the living body” (De anima 4.4.415b8, trans. from De Anima,
ed. Christopher Shields (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2016)) and Avicenna’s delineation
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ultimately discloses, in this way, is the essence of Dante’s entire
universe—the moment wherein the whole of God’s creation gives
lasting form to its perfection.
2. Human Perfection
Within Dante’s outlook, perfection was a straightforward idea with
critical nuances. In the general sense of the absence of defects, it
proceeded directly from the Aristotelian idea of form, which encompasses both the organic principle in which an entity originates
as well as the articulation and fulfillment of that principle in its material existence.14 In Dante’s version of Aristotle’s argument, in the
Convivio: “Ciascuna cosa è massimamente perfetta quando tocca e
aggiugne la sua virtude propria, e allora è massimamente secondo
sua natura” (4.16.7). Perfection coincides with a thing’s nature understood, at once, as the starting and the ending point of its existence. Which is to say that the existence of any given thing unfolds
as a return to the full, originary premise of its being. The importance of this conception in the philosophical framework of the
Commedia is outlined in Paradiso 29, where Beatrice explicitly
identifies the perfection of the whole of creation with its moment
of origin:
Forma e materia, congiunte e purette,
of souls arising from a common human “quiddity” (see esp. Logic 1.5.1-2 and Psychology 12 from the Book of Healing)). It is not with another cataloging of those
sources that this study is concerned, nor with the (relatively superfluous) question of
Dante’s theoretical conception of the soul’s individuation, but rather with the adaptation of that conception to the emergent language and vision of the Commedia.
14
See Alessandro Niccoli, “perfetto,” and Enrico Malato, “perfezione,” in Enciclopedia Dantesca. Caroline Walker Byrnum vividly retraces the Aristotelian background
of Dante’s approach to the ideas of perfection and embodiment: “Although discussion
stayed in the narrow confines of the university and theologians indeed remained uncomfortable with some of its ramifications, unicity of form and formal identity became
fairly widespread assumptions… Awareness of the implications of unicity of form and
an intense self-consciousness about somatomorphic representation enable Dante to
solve the identity problem and quell the ambivalence at the heart of the Augustinian
notion of yearning for body” (The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity,
200-1336 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 277-98). For Aristotle’s
argument, see esp. Physics 2.1: “The nature of a thing, then, is a certain principle and
cause of change and stability in the thing and it is directly present in it… form is a
more plausible candidate for being nature than matter is because we speak of a thing
as what it actually is at the time, rather than what it then is potentially… that which
is growing is proceeding from something to something—that is what it means to be
growing. What, then, is the endpoint of growth? It is not that which the growing is
from, but that which the growing is into. From which it follows that form is nature”
(trans. from Physics, ed. and trans. Robin Waterfield and David Bostock (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1996)).
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usciro ad esser che non avia fallo,
come d’arco tricordo tre saette. (Par. 29.22-24)

The beginning of the universe coincided with “pure” absence of
defects, whose entire form was realized and immanent in its material existence. The temporal universe inhabited by human beings,
accordingly, is structured by a constant tension towards that primeval state of perfection. At the heart of the cosmos’ concentric
spheres lies the “lowest” realm, as Beatrice says, of “pure potentiality” (“pura potenza tenne la parte ima,” Par. 29.34), earthly matter at the ready for a divine form to wrest it out of its inertness. At
the opposite end, outside of space and time, is the Empyrean, the
realm of “pure act” where the formative principles of everything
that exists immortally dwell (“e quelle furon cima / nel mondo in
che puro atto fu prodotto,” Par. 29.32-33). As God’s creative
power brings these to descend, mortal beings emerge and then
again plunge back into the inert passivity of matter.15 Approaching
and then again removed from one another, matter and form thus
exist in a perpetual tension to overcome separation towards their
originary, perfect state of co-immanence.16
The descent of God’s creative power occurs through the motion of the highest
sphere, the primum mobile, as Beatrice specifies in the next canto (“Fassi di raggio
tutta sua parvenza / reflesso al sommo del mobile primo, / che prende quivi vivere e
potenza,” Par. 30.106-108). In line with the reading developed here, that motion
constantly modulates the region between Earth and the Empyrean through the tension of matter and form (“nel mezzo strinse potenza con atto / tal vime, che già mai
non si divima,” Par. 29.33-36).
16
It may be objected that this interpretation superimposes a temporality beyond the
actual scope of Beatrice’s words, which describe the atemporal order of creation’s
constituents (the “pure act” of angelic intelligence, the “pure potentiality” of matter,
and the “unmediated” being of the heavens), in line with the Aristotelian conception
of the cosmos (see Aristotle’s De cœlo, Physics 8, and Metaphysics 12). This reading
does not call that conception into question, nor does it seek to impose a Neo-Platonic
perspective on the passage: the aim is rather to outline the relationship, in the poem’s
own terms, between the originary, eternal order of the universe and the temporality
that human souls are born into and move through. What Beatrice articulates is still,
after all, an account of creation, laying out the fundamental structure of a universe
whose perfection, on the scale of the individual soul, unfolds through the experience
of time. As Piero Boitani effectively puts it: “This is a canto which predicates being
in its primeval forms, and which moves through time and space to hover over outof-time and outside-space… In short, Dante’s is a complete rewriting of Genesis…
moving to the heart of the matter, the substance of things. Form and matter: each in
absolute, singular, purity, or united: that is to say, pure form (or pure act), angelic
intelligence; pure matter (or pure potency), prime matter; and form-and-matter together, a compound of both, the heavens. The three things together take the place of
the biblical heaven and earth, constituting the object of the Big Bang, and the foundations of the universe” (“The poetry and poetics of the creation,” in The Cambridge
Companion to Dante, ed. Rachel Jacoff (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007), 218-235, 226-28). For further discussion of the innovativeness of Dante’s
15
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Statius’s outline of a soul gathering both “the human and the
divine” into itself might appear difficult to reconcile with a universe
structured by the separation between matter and immortal form.17
On the one hand, in fact, such a notion is consistent with that of
human nature as a hylomorphic substance arranging matter into the
soul’s form. On the other hand, even Aristotle’s version of hylomorphism had to leave room for the separability of “some parts” of
the soul from its material body.18 In this sense, indeed, things would
seem to stand much more neatly in the Convivio, where the immortal “part” of the soul is singled out as a divine form that, at
death, returns to God (“con quella parte de la nostra anima che mai
non muore, a l’altissimo e gloriosissimo seminadore al cielo ritorna,” Conv. 4.23.3). The human body, by contrast, is cast as a
mortal “prison” in which the soul, until death, is held captive
(“mentre che l’anima è legata e incarcerata per li organi del nostro
corpo,” Conv. 2.4.17). The Convivio, therefore, would seem to
provide a first and unambiguous answer to the question set forth in
the introduction concerning the exact nature of the soul’s “human”
aspect: for the essence of human nature, in these terms, squarely
correlates with what Robert Harrison has called, after Giambattista
Vico, “a connection with the humus,” the mortality of the body

account, see also Boitani’s ‘La creazione nel Paradiso’, Filologia e critica 33 (Jan.-Apr.
2008): 3–34, as well as Alison Cornish’s “Planets and Angels in Paradiso XXIX: The
First Moment,” Dante Studies, with the Annual Report of the Dante Society 108
(1990): 1-28, and her reading of Paradiso 29 in connection with the “mind-body
problem” in “Paradiso 29: Saving the Appearances,” Dante Studies 137 (2019): 10723. These accounts also importantly engage with the relevance of this passage for what
Teodolinda Barolini terms the “poetics of the new” linking pilgrim’s and reader’s
experience in the journey of poetic creation (“Infernal Incipits: The Poetics of the
New,” in The Undivine “Comedy”: Detheologizing Dante (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 21-47).
17
For a review of the tension between philosophical argument and theological cogency in Statius’s speech, see Paolo Falzone’s “Filosofia e teologia nel canto XXV del
Purgatorio,” Bollettino di italianistica 1 (2006): 41-72. Of special interest is the comparison with Virgil’s shorter account of the physicality of souls in the afterlife, in
Purgatorio 3, as well as the discussion of Dante’s approach to the philosophical problem of embodiment and the need to reconcile rational argument with the primacy of
faith and revealed truth. See also Zygmut Barański’s “Canto XXV,” in Lectura Dantis
Turicensis, eds. George Güntert and Michelangelo Picone (Firenze: Franco Cesati,
2001), 389-406.
18
See Aristotle, De anima 2.1.413a3-7: “Therefore, that the soul is not separable from
the body, or some parts of it if it naturally has parts, is not unclear. For the actuality
of some parts belongs to the parts themselves. Even so, nothing hinders some parts
from being separable, because of their not being the actualities of any body” (trans.
from De Anima (2016)).
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destined to be buried in the earth, returning to matter and its inanimate, immoveable place thereafter.19
It is important to observe that, for all its corrective impetus,
Statius’s account of the genesis of the soul in Purgatorio 25 does
not actually stray far from this conception, since it also clearly distinguishes between an earthbound and a heavenly power that concur to shape the individual soul.20 The first of these is the “power
to shape” (“virtute informativa,” Purg. 25.41), the organic principle infused by the father’s sperm (“sangue perfetto,” Purg. 25.37),
which guides the development of the human embryo into a body
equipped with all sensory organs:
Anima fatta la virtute attiva
qual d’una pianta, in tanto differente,
che questa è in via e quella è già a riva,
tanto ovra poi, che già si move e sente,
come spungo marino; e indi imprende
ad organar le posse ond’è semente. (Purg. 25.52-57)

The second power (“spirito novo”) descends then from God (“lo
motor primo”) complementing body and senses with the possible
intellect:
… lo motor primo a lui si volge lieto
sovra tant’arte di natura, e spira
spirito novo, di vertù repleto,
che ciò che trova attivo quivi, tira
in sua sustanzia, e fassi un’alma sola,
che vive e sente e sé in sé rigira. (Purg. 25.70-75)

Far from breaking with the Convivio, therefore, Statius’s recapitulation goes a long way in consolidating the idea of the soul’s composite nature that Dante had first outlined there. Notably, this is
just as true of the similarities as it is of the differences between the
two accounts. The two formative powers that Statius describes, for
instance, are a simplification of many more that were originally
listed in the Convivio,21 highlighting Dante’s intent to shift
Robert P. Harrison, The Dominion of the Dead (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003), 34. For the etymological nexus proposed by Vico, see “Principj di
scienza nuova” § 12: “La seconda delle cose umane, per la quale a’ latini, da «humando», «seppellire», prima e propiamente vien detta «humanitas», sono le seppolture”
(from Scienza nuova, ed. Paolo Rossi (Milano: Rizzoli, 2012)).
20
About Albert the Great’s influence on this aspect of Statius’s speech and Dante’s
account of the “virtute informativa,” see note 29.
21
See Conv. 4.21.4: “E però dico che quando l’umano seme cade nel suo recettaculo,
cioè ne la matrice, esso porta seco la vertù de l’anima generativa e la vertù del cielo e
19

~ 128 ~
https://repository.upenn.edu/bibdant/vol5/iss1/6

10

Bartolucci: The Human Moment of the Soul

Bibliotheca Dantesca, 5 (2022): 119-149

emphasis, in this later categorization, from the specification of each
power’s physiological function to their origins: to the distinction,
that is to say, between the human realm of the body and the divine
realm of the “spirito novo.” As a result, the Commedia would also
clearly appear to associate the “human” dimension of existence
with the prison of flesh that the soul, at death, leaves behind. On
the one hand, human life is marked out as the moment in which
the soul originates in the form of an individual. On the other hand,
that form is still eventually destined to be “released from the flesh,”
transcending the mortal “humus” to which the body returns and
bringing the human moment of the soul’s existence to an end.
So, it would appear—yet herein precisely lies the paradox.
For if Statius’s account also unfolds along a clear separation between
the soul’s human origin and its immortal destiny, how are we then
to account for the statement that the soul, upon leaving the flesh,
carries off “both the human and the divine”?
Quando Lachesìs non ha più del lino,
solvesi da la carne, e in virtute
ne porta seco e l’umano e ’l divino.

One way around the quandary would be to interpret the notation
“in virtute,” here, to mean that human and divine elements leave
the flesh as manifest “potentialities,” in continuity with the two
formative powers they arose from.22 In this reading, the image of
la vertù de li elementi legati, cioè la complessione; e matura e dispone la materia a la
vertù formativa, la quale diede l’anima del generante; e la vertù formativa prepara li
organi a la vertù celestiale, che produce de la potenza del seme l’anima in vita.”
22
This is the reading reflected in Durling’s translation (“When Lachesis has no more
thread, the soul / is released from the flesh, and it carries off in its / powers both the
human and the divine”) though not, for instance, in Longfellow’s non-committal
adherence to Dante’s wording (“Whenever Lachesis has no more thread, / It separates
from the flesh, and virtually / Bears with itself the human and divine,” from The
Purgatorio, trans. Henry Wadsworth Longfellow (New York: Barnes & Noble,
2005)), nor in W. S. Merwin’s version, which keeps its ambiguity ingeniously at arm’s
length (“When Lachesis has no more flax, the soul is set / free of the flesh, and it
takes with it / its latent self, human and divine,” from Purgatorio: A New Verse
Translation by W. S. Merwin (New York: Knopf, 2001)). As Philippe Delhaye and
Giorgio Stabile clarify in their entry on “virtù” in the Enciclopedia Dantesca, Dante’s
flexible use of the term (“indica fondamentalmente una ‘capacità naturale a operare,’
sia nel senso di ‘disposizione’ o ‘idoneità’ a esplicare un'azione, sia in quello di ‘potenza’ o ‘energia’ esplicata”) leaves the question open as to whether he intended such
denotational continuity within Statius’s speech. An alternative confutation is offered
by Falzone, who traces the phrase “in virtute” back to Aquinas’s interpretation of
Augustine’s De spiritu et anima, indicating that the soul survives as the active subject
of its formed powers (“Filosofia e teologia,” 65-66)—a persuasive reading that, however, does not address the issue of embodiment discussed later in this article. Durling,
interestingly, attributes his terminological choice to the unprecedented quality of
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the Fates’ unweaving thread (“solvesi… porta seco”) would then
correspond to the literal extrapolation of the unitary form the self
generated by the conjunction of “virtute attiva” and “spirito
novo,” configuring the soul as its enduring spiritual mold. Even
casting pricklier hermeneutical issues aside,23 however, such an interpretation is difficult to reconcile with the idea of selfhood that
actually oriented Dante’s epistemological and imaginative outlook.
As Timothy Reiss has shown, there is a fundamental distinction to
be made between later notions of “self-fashioning,” anchored in
Renaissance and Cartesian conceptualizations of individuality as a
separate, internal essence, and the sense of embedded “passibility”
that, by contrast, shaped the understanding of human nature characteristic of the proto-humanistic cultures of medieval Europe:
Passibility was the fundamental nature of the human being as human.

Its relation to the endlessly multiple matter, qualities and events of its
surroundings—divine, animate, social, physical—was one of being always and constantly affected by simply being in them, more exactly,
being of them.24
Dante’s conception: “Naturally enough, there is nothing in earlier literature, theological or otherwise, like this passage, but it is integral to Dante’s conception of the
unified human person” (Durling’s note to Purg. 25.79-108).
23
As Anna Maria Chiavacci Leonardi’s observes: “l’espressione in virtute non può
significare «in potenza», cioè «non in atto», come molti spiegano, perché nella terzina
seguente è detto chiaramente che le facoltà intellettive (il divino) restano in atto anche
più acutamente di prima. Si dovrà dunque intendere virtute come «virtù sostanziale»… Tutte le potenze, «umane e divine», sono infatti radicate («in radice», come
si esprime Tommaso) nell’essenza stessa dell’anima” (note to Purg. 25.80-81, in La
Divina Commedia, ed. Anna Maria Chiavacci Leonardi (Milano: Mondadori, 199197)). Like Durling in the comment to his translation (see previous note), Chiavacci
Leonardi also contextualizes this line within the novelty of Dante’s conception extending to the invention of aerial bodies (discussed later in this article): “L’anima
separata… non ha fortuna nella Commedia. Tanto intenso è il desiderio di Dante di
dar risposta alla sua profonda aspirazione, che egli stesso crea la modalità di questa
corporeità spirituale… Se ci sono infatti vaghi e discussi precedenti all’idea di un corpo
sottile, etereo, nei padri più antichi della Chiesa… l’idea di come esso potesse formarsi
(per la stessa virtù, rimasta intatta e portata nell’aldilà, che formava le membra corporee nel seno materno, ed ora le imprime nell’aria circostante) appare del tutto dantesca… La ragione profonda di tutto il discorso è l’idea che l’uomo è sempre, anche
dopo morto, non puro spirito, ma anima e corpo, vale a dire umano e divino, storia
ed eternità” (“Introduzione al canto XXV”). Along similar lines, how to correlate an
eventual self-sufficiency of the spiritual element with Beatrice’s characterization of
primeval perfection as “Forma e materia, congiunte e purette”? Any reading of “in
virtute” as “in potentiality” seems bound to raise problems with respect to the emergent speculative framework of the Commedia.
24
Timothy J. Reiss, Mirages of the Selfe: Patterns of Personhood in Ancient and Early
Modern Europe, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 97. As Reiss succinctly puts it in the introduction, “There was no idea of a self free and independent
in its will, intentions and choices; none of a separate, private individual” (3). For a
reprisal of his discussion in connection with Dante, see Barbara Newman’s The

~ 130 ~
https://repository.upenn.edu/bibdant/vol5/iss1/6

12

Bartolucci: The Human Moment of the Soul

Bibliotheca Dantesca, 5 (2022): 119-149

In this earlier conception, rooted in Averroes’s distinction between
eternal “material” intellect and the “passible and corruptible” intellect of human beings (in Book 3 of his Long Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima, which Dante knew well), the existence of the
individual soul unfolds through the relations (the constant “give
and take in the universe”) defining and embedding it in its proper
place in the world.25 Any separation of that existence from a material sensible body, consequently, would have been all but inconceivable, and the rarefaction of the soul’s “human” aspect into a
disembodied formal power all but unintelligible, to Dante himself—a hermeneutical shortcut that, for all its seductiveness, would
not take us far into the riddle of Statius’s words.
3. The Organics of Personhood
How does the soul remain human after relinquishing its mortal
body? An alternative approach to the paradox just outlined is offered by another word Dante often employs in reference to human
beings, “persona,” whose etymological ramifications are especially
significant in the context of this discussion.26
Permeable Self: Five Medieval Relationships (Philadelphia, PA: University of Penn-

sylvania Press, 2021).
25
Reiss, Mirages of the Selfe, 106. For Averroes’s discussion of the relationship between material and passible intellect, see esp. Long Commentary 3.20: “You ought
to know that use and exercise are the causes of what appears to be the case concerning
the potency of the agent intellect which is in us for separating [things] and the material
intellect for receiving [things]. They are, I say, causes on account of the positive disposition existing through use and exercise in the passible and corruptible intellect
which Aristotle calls passible, and [which] he said plainly is corruptible. If not, it
would happen that the power which is in us making the intelligibles would be material and likewise the passible power. For this reason no one can reason on the basis of
this that the material intellect is mixed with the body” (trans. from Long Commentary
on the De Anima of Aristotle, ed. and trans. Richard C. Taylor (New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 2009).
26
It may be observed that the concepts of “soul” and “personhood,” in the NeoAristotelian tradition, are typically discussed in terms of the distinction between
“soul” and “intellect,” which is indeed crucial to Dante’s description of his soul’s
ultimate conjunction with the universal “mover” (God’s active intellect) at the end
of the poem: “ma già volgeva il mio disio e ’l velle, / sì come rota ch’igualmente è
mossa, / l’amor che move il sole e l’altre stelle” (Par. 33.143-45). The value of focusing on the relationship between soul and personhood, in this perspective, is that it
provides an avenue to consider the human end of that same conjunction, that is to
say, the soul’s transformation over the course of its journey towards it. With regard
to the poem’s conclusion, indeed, Chiavacci Leonardi argues that “amor vada qui
inteso non tanto come quello di Dio che muove l’universo, ma come quello (suscitato
da Dio) dell’universo che lo fa muovere, volgere verso di lui… nel canto I era stato
detto… che dalla direzione centripeta impressa da Dio verso se stesso a tutte le creature si diparte talvolta l’unica tra esse—l’uomo—che per la sua libertà ha il potere di
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The semantics of personhood harken back to the Latin verb
“personare” (“to sound out through”), which describes the way
actors in antiquity spoke through masks representing their characters on stage. “Persona” was the name of the mask—of the figure
brought to life by the actor’s body and voice.27 These associations
percolated into Dante’s idiom through the theological appropriation of St. Thomas Aquinas, who in the Summa theologiæ elevated
“persona” to index of all the “principia individuantia hominem”—
everything that characterizes a human being as an embodied and
individuated self. Indeed, embodiment is the key detail of Aquinas’s
definition: “‘person’… used of human nature refers to this flesh,
these bones and this soul which are the sources of man’s individuality.”28 Flesh and bones precede the soul as the scaffoldings of its
individual form: as the bodily mask through which the divine
power, as Statius puts it, “breathes” a new spirit (“spira / spirito
novo”) into the existence of a soul.29 What this implies is simple
resistere a tale divino impulso; ma l’uomo, una volta unito per grazia a Dio, non corre
più questo rischio, in quanto la sua libera volontà si identifica con quella divina…
Tale è la condizione di Dante alla fine del poema, stabilito nel puro amore di Dio”
(note to Par. 1.145, in La Divina Commedia (1991-97)). The exegetical angle taken
up in this section, accordingly, complements Dante’s recognition of the divine intellect at the heart of creation with a mapping of the soul’s course toward that recognition.
27
See “persona,” in L’Etimologico: Vocabolario della lingua italiana, ed. Alberto Nocentini (Milano: Le Monnier, 2010).
28
Aquinas, Summa theologiæ 1a.29.4 (trans. from The Trinity (1a.27-32), ed. and
trans. Ceslaus Velecky, vol. 6 of Summa Theologiæ (2006)). Byrnum pregnantly captures the persistent suggestiveness of embodiment in doctrinal disquisitions about
identity: “By the early fourteenth century, it was possible—at least for logicians and
theologians—to think of survival and identity of self without continuity of material
particles. But hundreds of years of insistence on bodily resurrection had come to locate in ‘soul’ much of our commonsense understanding of ‘body’… Although soul
now seemed to carry not only the particularity of self but also the pattern of body, it
needed body as a place to express that particularity and pattern. Even Dante (d. 1321),
who made technically correct use of the Thomistic notion that soul accounts for
identity… depicted his beloved Beatrice in the last cantos of the Divine Comedy not
simply as soul… [and] gave to his eponymous self a vision of the heavenly choir in
their resurrection bodies even though his poetic encounter was set before the end of
time” (The Resurrection of the Body, 10-11).
29
This definition is also notably in line with Albert the Great’s description—based on
Avicenna’s theorization—of the formative power that prepares the body in which the
rational soul is received (see De animalibus 16.1.4-12 and De anima 1.2.7; also Eugenio Massa, “Alberto Magno,” in Enciclopedia Dantesca), a fundamental source of
Statius’s organological account analyzed in this section. The agreement is pivotal in
the context of Aquinas’s and Albert’s divergences regarding the role of potentiality in
the interaction of matter and form (see esp. Nardi’s “La dottrina d’Alberto Magno
sull’‘inchoatio formae,’” and “Alberto Magno e San Tommaso,” in Studi di filosofia
medievale (Roma: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1960), 69-101, 103-18, as well as
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but paramount, for the body is unambiguously singled out as the
catalyst of the process of individuation in which the soul originates.
Such a conception noticeably diverges from the one outlined in the
Convivio, where Dante characterizes the soul not as the endpoint
but rather as the “cause,” the anteceding principle of bodily existence (“l’anima è atto del corpo; e se ella è suo atto, è sua cagione,”
Conv. 3.6.11). It is essential, therefore, to verify how far the Commedia ventures from that initial position.
According to Purgatorio 25, as we saw, no soul exists prior
to the human flesh and bones that have been prepared to bring it
into existence, since the “spirito novo” descends only once the embryo has grown into a body that “moves and has feeling” (“che già
si move e sente”). Statius further underscores the body’s incarnational primacy by leveraging another key concept, that of “organo,” which describes all the sensory organs connecting the human body with its surroundings.30 The verb “organare” is the one
he uses in reference to the work of the “virtute informativa,” which
“imprende / ad organar le posse ond’è semente,” organizing the
fetus in accordance with the body’s five senses (“posse”). It is very
significant, therefore, that the selfsame “virtute” then prepares an
additional “organo” to enable the infusion of the “spirito novo”
into the body—the brain:
… quest’è tal punto
che più savio di te fé già errante,
sì che per sua dottrina fé disgiunto
de l’anima il possibile intelletto,
perché da lui non vide organo assunto.
Apri a la verità che viene il petto;
e sappi che, sì tosto come al feto
l’articular del cerebro è perfetto,
lo motor primo a lui si volge lieto
sovra tant’arte di natura, e spira
spirito novo, di virtù repleto. (Purg. 25.62-72)

The embattled articulation of this idea, pitched emphatically against
Averroes’s (“più savio di te”) “erratic” theorization of an extracorporeal intellect, underscores its importance for Dante’s own conception of the soul’s nature.31 The existence of a designated organ
Dal “Convivio” alla “Commedia” (Sei saggi danteschi) (Roma: Istituto storico ita-

liano per il medio evo, 1960)).
30
See Alessandro Niccoli, “organo,” in Enciclopedia Dantesca.
31
For a recent integration to discussions about Averroes’s theory and the Latin Averroists’ arguments, see Peter Adamson’s Philosophy in the Islamic World (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2016).
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for the incorporation of the “spirito novo,” as a matter of fact, foregrounds a subtle but fundamental aspect of the soul’s incarnation,
namely the material equalization of its human and divine constituents. If “virtute informativa” and “spirito novo,” in fact, equally
depend on bodily organs to converge into a new, personified existence, then the body not only prefigures, but actively shapes, and
indeed manifests, the eternal form of the soul: it is the most literal
version imaginable, in other words, of the Aquinian mask of flesh
and bones (it seems especially meaningful, in this sense, that of all
possible characters Dante chose Statius, a poet from antiquity, as
the mouthpiece for this recuperation of the performative and incarnational roots of the idea of “persona”). Moving beyond the
causative differentiation of the Convivio, the Commedia thus posits human personhood in its material, flesh-bound entirety (“this
flesh, these bones and this soul”) as the one and only form in which
it will ever be possible for the soul to exist—an existence tied in
perpetuo, as Reiss noted, to the experience of inhabiting a particular body in the world.
This reading finds confirmation in the poetic invention of
aerial bodies, which Statius brings up to illustrate the soul’s continued existence after death.32 For it is precisely through an impulse
to replicate the body’s presence that the soul survives, as he explains:
Tosto che loco lì la circunscrive,
la virtù formativa raggia intorno
così e quanto ne le membra vive. (Purg. 25.88-90)

Incarnation endures as the paradigm of the soul’s immortality. A
paradigm, it must be observed, that unfolds in no abstracted or disembodied potentiality, but by virtue of a “formative power” strikingly akin to the “virtute informativa” that generated the soul’s first,
human body. Statius pairs up two adverbs to highlight this parallel
and the fact that the soul, in this way, persists not as a ghostly form,
but in “radiant” reminiscence of its bodily existence: “così e quanto
ne le membra vive”—as lifelike as the living body, in outer aspect
as well as intensity of feeling and thought. Such insistence underscores the deeply literal sense in which the aerial body provides “a
constitutive mechanism for our continued human personhood after
death,” as Heather Webb has noted, “just as the embryonic body
For a review of derivative and original aspects of the idea of aerial bodies, see Falzone, “Filosofia e teologia,” 70-71, and Chiavacci Leonardi’s commentary quoted in
note 23.
32
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and infused soul are constitutive of our humanity at birth.”33 Statius
reiterates this continuity, once again, through the incarnational semantics of “organo”:
Però che quindi ha poscia sua paruta,
è chiamata ombra; e quindi organa poi
ciascun sentire infino a la veduta. (Purg. 25.100-102)

The soul unfolds into the air as an immortal, self-organizing presence, identical with the personified form of its body—transcending,
yes, its human mortality, and yet never the human moment of its
origin.
4. Transcending Bodies
Even this poetic revisitation of personhood, nevertheless, presents
a difficulty. If the soul, in fact, lives on in immortal perpetuation of
its human origin, what is decisive—or even just distinctive—about
its passage out of mortality? It is time to take another look at Dante’s
statement, in the Convivio, that the soul after death transitions into
“a nature which is more than human” (“perpetualmente dura in
natura più che umana,” 2.8.6), with all the elements now in place
to see why this is a notion that the Commedia does not disavow,
but actually follows through to its ultimate, revealing consequences.
In and of itself, the permanence of human personhood does
not imply that the soul remains anchored to the bodily realm of
matter—its “connection with the humus”—particularly when we
recall that matter, as Beatrice explains in Paradiso 29, is a dimension
of “pure potentiality”: that which must be transcended to reach the
divine realm of “pure act.” In the conclusion of his speech, Statius
gestures precisely towards this transcension as the marker of the
soul’s passage out of human existence. Once the soul has been released from the flesh, its inner motions manifest with an immediacy
that would have been unimaginable through the mediation of an
earthly body:
Secondo che ci affiggono i disiri
e li altri affetti, l’ombra si figura;
e quest’è la cagion di che tu miri. (Purg. 25.106-108)

This tercet describes the aerial body as a purified (“wondrous,” indeed) manifestation of the soul. To tease out the significance of this
Heather Webb, Dante’s Persons: An Ethics of the Transhuman (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2016), 17.
33
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characterization, it is helpful to contextualize it within the notion
of “pureness” that Dante derived from St. Albert the Great, explicated in the Convivio by way of the following simile. Just as the
light of the sun shines more or less manifestly through earthly bodies according to their “diaphanousness” (“Vedemo la luce del sole,
la quale è una, da uno fonte derivata, diversamente da le corpora
essere ricevuta”), so God’s divine power is more or less manifest
according to the degree in which a creature’s material existence
obfuscates its nature, that is to say, the actualization of its form
(which, as we saw, is both cause and endpoint of the existence of
everything God creates).34 Angels, entirely separate from matter,
are therefore the “purest” of all beings. Human beings, by contrast,
are caught up in their earthly bodies “sì come l’uomo ch’è tutto ne
l’acqua fuor del capo, del quale non si può dire che tutto sia ne
l’acqua né tutto fuor da quella” (Conv. 3.7.5). At the same time
that the body’s flesh and bones individuate it as a personified self,
they also constrain the soul to an interior, invisible, “impurely”
manifest existence.
At the same time that the soul is given form, it is also concealed by the mask of the body—a mask that “desires / and other
feelings” need to traverse until death, at last, allows them to transcend it. In this sense, Statius’s speech clearly characterizes death as
the passage into a different state of affairs: “Secondo che ci affiggono i disiri / e li altri affetti, l’ombra si figura”—in contrast with
the impurity of the flesh, the aerial body configures an instant correspondence between the soul’s inner movements and their visible
manifestation. Concurrently, it is also crucial to notice how carefully Statius’s wording emphasizes the affinity, rather than the discrepancy, between the workings of earthly and aerial body. The
reappearance discussed earlier of the verb “organare,” just two tercets before this passage (“e quindi organa poi / ciascun sentire infino a la veduta,” Purg. 25.101-102), punctuates a parallel between
See Conv. 3.7.3-4: “Veramente ciascuna cosa riceve da quello discorrimento secondo lo modo de la sua vertù e de lo suo essere; e di ciò sensibile essemplo avere
potemo dal sole. Vedemo la luce del sole, la quale è una, da uno fonte derivata, diversamente da le corpora essere ricevuta; sì come dice Alberto, in quello libro che fa
de lo Intelletto, che certi corpi, «per molta chiaritade di diafano avere in sé mista,
tosto che ’l sole li vede diventano tanto luminosi, che per multiplicamento di luce in
quelle e ne lo loro aspetto, rendono a li altri di sé grande splendore», sì come è l’oro,
e alcuna pietra. «Certi sono che, per esser del tutto diafani, non solamente ricevono
la luce, ma quella non impediscono, anzi rendono lei del loro colore colorata ne l’altre
cose. E certi sono tanto vincenti ne la purità del diafano, che divengono sì raggianti,
che vincono l’armonia de l’occhio, e non si lasciano vedere sanza fatica del viso,” sì
come sono li specchi. Certi altri sono tanto sanza diafano, che quasi poco de la luce
ricevono, sì come la terra.”
34
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the processes of corporal mediation and aerial “figuring,” which
indexes them as different but intimately interrelated stages in the
soul’s progression towards its fully manifest form. A progression by
way of which “the self, including its physical characteristics and
qualities,” as Manuele Gragnolati has put it, “seems to be wholly
packed into the self-sufficient souls of the Commedia.”35 In its aerial body the soul finally shines forth, wholly packed into the “pure”
and unobstructed immanence of the self in the world.
In this way, far from refuting the notion of a human form
ascending into “a nature which is more than human,” the Commedia vividly radicalizes Dante’s effort to come to grips with the
imaginative paradox that notion entails. A powerful dramatization
of this effort is his failed embrace with the singer Casella, in Purgatorio 2, which (rather topically) may appear to run counter to the
reading developed so far. While the intensely physicalized souls in
Inferno would seem to conform easily,36 in fact, to an interpretation
of aerial “figuring” as a fuller and unobstructed manifestation of the
soul, this episode famously signals an abrupt cessation of all physical
contact upon reaching the Mountain of Purgatory, which is less
intuitive but equally important to account for. Casella has just arrived at the foot of the Mountain after three months spent on the
banks of the river Tiber, waiting for his will to conform to God’s
“just” wish for his penitence and redemption (“ché di giusto voler
lo suo si face,” Purg. 2.97). And as soon as he recognizes Dante, he
makes towards him:
Io vidi una di lor trarresi avante
per abbracciarmi con sì grande affetto,
che mosse me a far lo somigliante.
Ohi ombre vane, fuor che ne l’aspetto!
tre volte dietro a lei le mani avvinsi,
e tante mi tornai con esse al petto. (Purg. 2.76-81)

Manuele Gragnolati, “Nostalgia in Heaven: Embraces, Affection and Identity in
the Commedia,” in Dante and the Human Body: Eight Essays, eds. John C. Barnes
and Jennifer Petrie (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2007), 117-37, 120. See also “Embryology and Aerial Bodies in Dante’s Comedy,” in Experiencing the Afterlife: Soul
and Body in Dante and Medieval Culture (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 2005), 53-87.
36
Think of Dante’s repeated physical contacts with Virgil, for instance, or the way he
caresses Brunetto Latini (Inf. 15.25-30) and yanks at the hair of Bocca degli Abati
(Inf. 32.97-123). As Rebecca West remarks: “The Inferno is the most sense-oriented
of the Canticles. There Dante often both is touched and touches… his guide and
certain shades, both loved and despised” (“On the Sense of Touch in the Divine
Comedy,” Lectura Dantis 5 (Fall 1989): 46-58, 49). See also Falzone, “Filosofia e
teologia,” 48-56, for a review of the philosophical debate on this issue.
35
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Dante’s marvel (“Di maraviglia, credo, mi dipinsi,” v. 82) spotlights
the occurrence’s unprecedented quality, amplified by the contrast
with Casella’s lack of surprise at his own failed attempt to embrace
the old friend. Such is the consequence, he seems to suggest, of
having left one’s mortal body behind: “Così com’io t’amai / nel
mortal corpo, così t’amo sciolta” (vv. 88-90). The function of this
encounter within the larger theological framework of the Commedia has been the object of long and insightful examination, offering
an array of contextual solutions to the apparent contradiction between Dante’s depiction of his interactions with souls up until this
moment and Casella’s sudden disembodiment.37 What remains
troubling for the present discussion, nevertheless, is the potential
implication of Casella’s words that removal from the mortal body
has weakened, rather intensified, the manifestation of the soul’s
“disiri / e li altri affetti.” If Casella’s “love” for Dante is unchanged,
why can’t he follow through with the impulse to embrace him?
How does this inability match the idea of a soul more immediately
and purely manifest in its aerial body?
Casella’s description of his new condition, it will have been
noticed, anticipates the exact same figuration of the soul’s transition
into immortality that later reappears in Purgatorio 25—that of a
thread “unwoven” from the flesh (“sciolta”). Resonances of this
kind are integral to the internal structure the Commedia, and by
alerting the reader to the continuity between the two episodes, this
one draws attention to their correspondence as well as their complementarity in the poem’s unfolding inquiry into the nature of the
soul. As a matter of fact, the continuation of that same passage in
Notably, among recent interventions, Lino Pertile’s reading of Cato’s later injunction to the penitent souls (“Correte al monte a spogliarvi lo scoglio / ch’esser non
lascia a voi Dio manifesto,” Purg. 2.122-23) correlating their mortal “raiment” with
the “condizione di corruttibilità fisica e spirituale in cui, con il primo peccato, caddero
i protoplasti e con essi l’intero genere umano” (“Lo scoglio e la vesta,” in La punta
del disio. Semantica del desiderio nella Commedia (Fiesole: Cadmo, 2005), 59-83,
67), as well as Angelo Maria Mangini’s reappraisal of the connection between Cato’s
and Virgil’s earlier reference to that same “raiment” (“la vesta ch’al gran dì sarà sì
chiara,” Purg. 1.75) as complementary parts of Dante’s appropriation of the Pauline
doctrine of “purificazione/expoliatio” (“Virgilio, Catone e la “vesta”: due versioni
della salvezza,” Studi e problemi di critica testuale 90 (Apr. 2015): 191-208). These
accounts provide suggestive frameworks to interpret the contrast between the physicality of the damned and Casella’s disembodiment in the context of their opposite
moral turns, respectively towards and away from, sin and the impurity of earthly existence. See also Kevin Marti’s discussion of Pauline imagery and the theme of resurrection in “Dante’s ‘Baptism’ and the Theology of the Body in Purgatorio 1-2,” Traditio 45 (1989-90): 167-90, and Rachel Jacoff’s “‘Our Bodies, Our Selves’: The Body
in the Commedia,” in Sparks and Seeds: Medieval Literature and its Afterlife. Essays
in Honor of John Freccero, eds. Dana E. Stewart and Alison Cornish (Turnhout:
Brepols Publishers, 2000), 119-37.
37
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Statius’s speech provides an illuminating gloss on the phenomenology of the failed embrace:
Quando Lachesìs non ha più del lino,
solvesi da la carne, e in virtute
ne porta seco e l’umano e ’l divino:
l’altre potenze tutte quante mute;
memoria, intelligenza e volontade
in atto molto più che prima agute. (Purg. 25.79-84)

As the body is relinquished, the unification of human and divine
elements into the soul’s immortal substance arranges its faculties
into a precise hierarchy, dimming out the sensory (“l’altre potenze,” the “posse” shaped earlier into the organs by the “virtute
attiva,” Purg. 25.52-57) while sharpening the rational ones:
memory, understanding, and will.38 In accordance with this arrangement, the latter three faculties’ central role in the purgatorial
journey of redemption has been extensively noted and analyzed,
beginning with Charles Singleton’s reading of Purgatorio in light
of the Commedia’s larger concern with the theme of conversion,
the soul’s “turn” from earthly sin towards God.39 In this connection, particularly relevant here is the correlation between one of
these faculties, the will, and what Jacques Le Goff has called the
“symphony” of purgatorial temporality, “a composite of the experience of each of the souls undergoing trial in the space between
earth and Heaven… between the memory of the living and the
anxiety of the dead.”40 As the souls that Dante meets on the Mountain of Purgatory repeatedly testify, the experience of conversion is
indeed one of trying, gradual release from the vagaries and distractions of earthly life, in anticipation of the final ascent into Heaven
and God’s eternal light. Along the way, a “continual dialectic between forward motion and backward glance, voyage and repose,
The three faculties of the rational soul, as set forth in Augustine’s De Trinitate
10.12.17-19. Dante outlines his conception of the will as a rational faculty in Purgatorio 18 (“Or perché a questa ogn’ altra si raccoglia, / innata v’è la virtù che consiglia,
/ e de l’assenso de’ tener la soglia. / Quest’è ’l principio là onde si piglia / ragion di
meritare in voi, secondo / che buoni e rei amori accoglie e viglia,” Purg. 18.61-66).
39
Charles Singleton, “In Exitu Israel De Aegypto,” Annual Report of the Dante
Society, with Accompanying Papers 78 (1960): 1-24. For a review and integration of
Singleton’s thesis foregrounding the link between the performance and the embodiment of salvation, see Albert Russell Ascoli’s “Performing Salvation in Dante’s Commedia,” Dante Studies 135 (2017): 74-106.
40
Jacques Le Goff, The Birth of Purgatory, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1984), 353. See also Barbara Reynolds’s discussion of
the failed embrace in “The Morning Sun,” in Dante: The Poet, The Political
Thinker, The Man (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 251-57.
38
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illicit curiosity and necessary desire,” as Teodolinda Barolini has
remarked in reference to Dante and Casella’s encounter, tracks “the
will’s transition—in time—from mortal to immortal objects of desire”: the soul’s transformation, moment by moment, as the will
shifts between the “memory” of living and the “anxiety” to turn
away from it, toward its ultimate destination.41
This dynamic is key to see how Statius’s words help to clarify
the problem of the failed embrace. For it is at a very specific moment in the transitional temporality just outlined, as we saw, that
Dante and Casella meet—when Casella’s will, after three months
of wait on the Tiber’s bank, has turned in the same “just” direction
as God’s own:
… Nessun m’è fatto oltraggio,
se quei che leva quando e cui li piace,
più volte m’ha negato esto passaggio;
ché di giusto voler lo suo si face
veramente da tre mesi elli ha tolto
chi ha voluto intrar, con tutta pace. (Purg. 2.94-99)

As a reflection of the “sharper” motions of his will and the other
rational faculties, which have now taken over the “muted” sensory
ones, Casella’s inability to touch or be touched becomes legible not
as a failure to manifest his love for Dante, but as the clearest possible
“figuration” of his newfound resolve to turn away from such
earthly affections towards God, “from mortal to immortal objects
of desire.”42 The contrast with the physicality of the souls in hell,
Barolini, The Undivine “Comedy, 101-103. For Barolini, the encounter dramatizes
the very “essence” of this dynamic: “Indeed, the experience of purgatory is the conversion of the old back into the new: the unmaking of memory, in which the once
new has been stored as old. No episode in Inferno or Paradiso captures the essence of
the earthly pilgrimage like the Casella episode at the beginning of Purgatorio, whose
structure faithfully replicates life’s—and terza rima’s—continual dialectic between forward motion and backward glance, voyage and repose, illicit curiosity and necessary
desire” (101).
42
A figuration that does not contradict or exclude that of the other two rational
faculties, importantly, but is equally legible as a reflection of the alignment of all three
with God’s will—of Casella’s understanding, enabling discernment of the necessary
turn from mortal to immortal objects of desire, as well as his memory (as discussed
later in this paragraph). The fact that it was a strange choice for Dante, based on
philosophical precedent, to include memory among the faculties that are intensified,
rather than weakened, by the soul’s passage into the afterlife (for a review of this
discussion, see Falzone, “Filosofia e teologia,” 66-67) leaves room for the hermeneutical task of discerning its role in the phenomenology of aerial figuring. A corroborating intertext here is the other failed embrace of Purgatorio, between two souls this
time whose wills have similarly turned away from earthly affections, Virgil and Statius:
“Già s’inchinava ad abbracciar li piedi / al mio dottor, ma el li disse: “Frate, / non
far, ché tu se’ ombra e ombra vedi.” / Ed ei surgendo: «Or puoi la quantitate /
41
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from this vantage, appears equally coherent with the defining turn
of their will in the exact opposite direction, away from God towards the eternal, tormenting “memory” of the life that led them
to damnation.43 Indicatively, it is worth recalling that when that
same memory stirs in Casella at the sight of the old friend, the “affetto” still radiates so powerfully through his vanishing figure that
it instantly communicates itself to Dante, dramatically “moving”
him before he has even had time to recognize who it is that he is
trying to embrace (“Io vidi una di lor trarresi avante / per abbracciarmi con sì grande affetto, / che mosse me a far lo somigliante,”
Purg. 2.76-78). Even as the soul embodies its turn towards God so
purely as to literally fade out of the embrace of a “living,” mortal
object of desire, the human transport of that desire (of Casella’s
“disiri / e li altri affetti”) never transpired so immediately as from
this aerial body transcending away into eternity. And precisely the
paradox of this transcending immanence is what Dante’s imagination ultimately sought to confront.
5. Ripening
From a theological standpoint, Dante’s inquiry into the relationship
of soul and body reaches its climax in Paradiso 7, where Beatrice
takes up the question of divine justice in the context of Christ’s
crucifixion and the destruction of Jerusalem (“come giusta vendetta
giustamente / punita fosse,” Par. 7.20-21) and lays out a complete
theory of incarnation and resurrection (both words that only appear
in this canto). One of the doctrinal foundations of her speech, especially interesting for the present discussion, is the originary emanation of human nature (foreshadowing the account of universal
creation of Paradiso 29) directly from God’s divine power (“La
divina bontà… // che dispiega le bellezze etterne,” vv. 64-66), in
a perfect “resemblance” subsequently corrupted by sin (“Di tutte
queste dote s’avvantaggia / l’umana creatura… // Solo il peccato è
quel che la disfranca / e falla dissìmile al sommo bene,” vv. 7680).44 The restoration of that originary affinity is at the heart of the
comprender de l’amor ch’a te mi scalda, / quand’io dismento nostra vanitate, / trattando l’ombre come cosa salda.” (Purg. 21.130-36).
43
As Singleton noted in his commentary to Inferno, in fact, through the descent down
the circles of hell “the wayfarer will encounter souls that are much more substantial
and corporeal,” reinforcing the sense of a correlation between the physicality of the
damned and the degree of their will’s turn (quite literally) into the earthly depths of
sin (Inferno, 2: Commentary, vol. 1, part 2 of The Divine Comedy, 3 vols., ed. and
trans. Charles S. Singleton (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970-75), 100.
44
The direct antecedent of Dante’s elaboration of this doctrine is the discussion of the
human soul’s excellence and qualities in Book 3 of the Convivio: “E quella anima
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great speculative innovation that concludes the canto—an “argument” for the immortality not only of the soul, but also of the body:
L’anima d’ogne bruto e de le piante
di complession potenziata tira
lo raggio e ’l moto de le luci sante;
ma vostra vita sanza mezzo spira
la somma beninanza, e la innamora
di sé sì che poi sempre la disira.
E quinci puoi argomentare ancora
vostra resurrezion, se tu ripensi
come l’umana carne fessi allora
che li primi parenti intrambo fensi. (Par. 7.139-48)

Unlike the mortal souls of animals and plants, generated by the refraction of divine power through a “potentiated” medium of
earthly matter, the direct “inspiration” of human beings (ever since
the creation of Adam and Eve, “li primi parenti”) from the source
of that power (“la somma beninanza”) argues not just for their immortal nature, but specifically for that of the “flesh” in which they
first came to life. While Dante probably derived this idea from St.
Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo?, the details of its elaboration here are
unprecedented, and crucial for his larger imaginative quest.45 For
che tutte queste potenze comprende, e perfettissima di tutte l’altre, è l’anima umana,
la quale con la nobilitade de la potenza ultima, cioè ragione, participa de la divina
natura a guisa di sempiterna intelligenzia; però che l’anima è tanto in quella sovrana
potenza nobilitata e dinudata da materia, che la divina luce, come in angelo, raggia in
quella: e però è l’uomo divino animale da li filosofi chiamato” (3.2.14). Commentators have acknowledged the originality of Dante’s refurbishment of this philosophical
stance in the Commedia (“Dante segue la linea maestra, di Agostino, Anselmo e
Tommaso, ma la spiegazione, unica per forza di sintesi e bellezza del linguaggio, che
egli dà della difficile dottrina, è ancora il testo più chiaro e convincente… che si abbia
sull’argomento,” Chiavacci Leonardi, note to Par. 7.61, in La Divina Commedia
(1991-97)), highlighting the need to inquire into its recapitulative and speculative
elements alike. In this sense, other parallels fall beyond the scope of this discussion,
but would be worth exploring, between this canto and Purgatorio 25, like the echo
of the “humiliating” conjunction of divine and human nature in Christ’s incarnation
(“e tutti li altri modi erano scarsi / a la giustizia, se ’l Figliuol di Dio / non fosse
umiliato ad incarnarsi,” Par. 7.118-20) in the soul’s reverse ascent as a “human and
divine” entity after death.
45
Edward Moore’s analysis of terminological correspondences between Beatrice’s
speech and Anselm’s argument remains a seminal reference in this regard (“Dante’s
Theory of Creation,” in Studies in Dante. Fourth Series (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1917), 134-65). Anselm’s influence notwithstanding, as Chiavacci Leonardi notes:
“L’argomento di Dante, che attribuisce al corpo stesso, indipendentemente
dall’anima, il carattere di immortalità in quanto uscito dalle mani stesse di Dio… non
si ritrova nei testi comunemente noti della tradizione teologica su questo problema,
tanto più che anche per l’anima l’immortalità era considerata generalmente un dono
di grazia in quanto non dimostrabile in modo assolutamente certo per via di ragione…
Non è dunque da escludere che Dante… abbia ideato lui stesso il suo argomento
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the Commedia, as we saw, alongside the soundness of its arguments, is after a vision: not simply a justification of the body’s ultimate “resurrection,” but an intuition of its reality as part of the
concrete, unfolding destiny of human existence.
The challenging quality of that intuition briefly surfaces in
the strange dichotomy drawn up in this passage between the impermanence of other souls (“L’anima d’ogne bruto”) and the enduring wholeness not of the human soul, but of human “life”
(“vostra vita”)—wherein the very word “soul,” surprisingly, seems
to stand in for the mortality that human beings, unlike other earthbound creatures, eventually overcome.46 What does this mean? Has
come qui è formulato, dato che il principio della dignità suprema del corpo dell’uomo
in quanto tale è tipico del suo pensiero e lo porta anche altrove… ad affermazioni che
vanno al di là della teologia corrente al suo tempo.” (note to Par. 7.145-48, in La
Divina Commedia (1991-97)). The relevant passage of Cur Deus Homo? is Book 2,
Chapter 3: “That he rises with the body in which he lives in this life… Hence there
is proof that there is to be at some time a resurrection of the dead. For if man is to be
restored in perfection, he ought to be reconstituted as the sort of being he would have
been if he had not sinned… In the same way, therefore, that if man had not sinned,
he would have been bound to undergo change into incorruptibility, likewise it is
right that, when in the future he is restored, he will be restored in the body in which
he lives in this life… Nothing more just or appropriate can be conceived of than that,
just as a human being, if he had persevered in righteousness, would have enjoyed
eternal blessedness as an entirety, that is, with soul and body, similarly, if he perseveres
in unrighteousness, he should, as an entirety, be eternally miserable” (trans. from Anselm of Canterbury, “Why God Became Man,” in The Major Works, eds. Brian
Davies and G. R. Evans (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998)).
The basis of this argument is the Pauline doctrine of the resurrection of spiritual bodies
in 1 Cor 15:39-44: “Not all flesh is alike, but there is one flesh for human beings,
another for animals, another for birds, and another for fish. There are both heavenly
bodies and earthly bodies, but the glory of the heavenly is one thing, and that of the
earthly is another. There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and
another glory of the stars; indeed, star differs from star in glory. So it is with the
resurrection of the dead. What is sown is perishable, what is raised is imperishable. It
is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory. It is sown in weakness, it is raised in power.
It is sown a physical body, it is raised a spiritual body. If there is a physical body, there
is also a spiritual body” (trans. from The New Oxford Annotated Bible, 4th Edition,
ed. Michael D. Coogan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)).
46
It is possible to play down the singularity of this dichotomy, as some commentators
do (see Alessandro Niccoli’s note on this passage in the entry on “vita” in the Enciclopedia Dantesca, for instance, and Chiavacci Leonardi’s commentary in La Divina
Commedia (1991-97)), by reading the term “vita” as a synonym or metonymical
equivalent of “anima” (“principio vitale”) within the narrower context of Dante’s
theory of reproduction (as in Conv. 4.21.4, where he describes “la vertù celestiale,
che produce de la potenza del seme l’anima in vita”—see note 21). While plausible,
such a restrictive interpretation seems difficult to reconcile with the expansive eschatological context of Paradiso 7, where it gives problematically short shrift to the fact
that Dante could easily have smoothed over the terminological ambiguity (including,
notably, through the repetition of “anima” in v. 142, which would have added emphasis to the metrical parallel between the two terms of the comparison, without
altering the line’s syllable count nor significantly impacting the stress pattern), had
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the idea of an immortal soul, somehow, become incongruous—
insufficient to describe the kind of unmediated unity (“vostra vita
sanza mezzo spira”) in which humankind originated, and whose
ultimate restoration Beatrice is now announcing? It is a singular
terminological choice in the Commedia, which fleetingly but significantly exposes the imaginative effort catalyzed by one of the
poem’s central words: as if the paradox of the soul, for a moment,
registered in the very language of that effort, short-circuiting a path
to the elusive but necessary questions that poet and reader must
ultimately confront. What is the difference, the canto prompts (and
then leaves) us to ask, between a “soul” and what here, apparently,
can only be termed a “life”? What turns one into the other—our
immortal soul, after death, back into the “umana creatura” whose
existence was once the full and perfect inspiration of God’s own?
A helpful lens to consider these questions is an idea that all
throughout the Commedia is associated with the soul’s journey in
the afterlife, the process of “ripening” (“maturazione”).47 In Inferno, for instance, the spiritual condition of the damned is repeatedly described a lack of ripeness, as when Dante notices Capaneo’s
immoveable figure under the fire raining over the violent against
God, and asks Virgil:
… chi è quel grande che non par che curi
lo ‘ncendio e giace dispettoso e torto,
sì che la pioggia non par che ‘l marturi? (Inf. 14.46-48)

Later, in Malebolge, rummaging furiously around for the soul of a
thief, the centaur Caco similarly roars: “Ov’è, ov’è l’acerbo?” (Inf.
25.18). Such insistence gradually conveys the impression of an association that reaches beyond the merely descriptive or metaphorical, and grows still more distinctive in Purgatorio, where Dante,
for example, addresses the soul of Pope Hadrian IV in the following
terms: “Spirto in cui pianger matura / quel sanza ’l quale a Dio
there not been some intent in the arrangement. Indicatively, even translators tend to
steer clear of such interpretive narrowing here, including Durling (“but the highest
Love breathes your life into / you without intermediary”), Longfellow (“But your
own life immediately inspires / Supreme Beneficence”), and Mandelbaum (“but your
life is breathed forth immediately / by the Chief Good,” from The Divine Comedy
of Dante Alighieri: Paradiso, trans. Allen Mandelbaum (New York: Bantam, 1986)).
47
It is surprising that this motif has not received more attention. As Byrnum observes:
“Such intense particularity characterizes the somatomorphic souls of Dante’s Divine
Comedy… so glorious and necessary is body to Dante, in all its fullness and complexity, that the aerial body is not enough. We ‘yearn’ for the ‘luster’ and ‘ripeness’ of a
resurrection that completes rather than overcomes fertility—and we desire it not only
in order to know but also in order to love” (The Resurrection of the Body, 298).
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tornar non pòssi” (Purg. 19.91-92). Indeed, the penitent soul finds
the verb so apt that he brings it up again at the end the conversation:
Vattene omai: non vo’ che più t’arresti;
ché la tua stanza mio pianger disagia,
col qual maturo ciò che tu dicesti. (Purg. 19.140-41)

Time and again, the idea of ripening returns less and less as an illustration, and more and more plainly as a nomenclature for the
process that Dante observes each soul undergo in the afterlife. As a
result, the concepts of redemption and purification (or lack thereof)
unfold less and less in the negative semantic field of privation, and
more and more openly through an effusive paradigm of increase
and fulfillment.
This paradigm evidently adds an important dimension to the
earlier discussion about the soul’s transition from earthly to aerial
body. The direct correspondence between its inner movements and
their outer manifestation, in fact, positions the aerial body squarely
in the middle of this ripening process, as the visible cipher of the
soul’s ongoing progression towards redemption and its ultimate
destiny—a cipher that already “figures” that destiny, indeed, as the
soul’s perfect immanence in its bodily form. In line with this reading, the nexus between the ideas of purification and ripeness culminates in Saint Benedict’s description of the Empyrean itself, in
Paradiso 22, as the place where “è perfetta, matura e intera / ciascuna disïanza” (Par. 22.64-65). The final form that all creation
tends towards, eternally actualized where God himself dwells, is the
“ripened” manifestation of every desire giving full and perfect expression to divine power (“La divina bontà”). As we saw, this is
how Statius had also described the fundamental nature and function
of the aerial body—as an immediate manifestation of the soul’s desires and affects:
Secondo che ci affiggono i disiri
e li altri affetti, l’ombra si figura;
e quest’è la cagion di che tu miri. (Purg. 25.106-08)

Just as the repetition of the verb “organare,” in Purgatorio 25,
served to underscore the continuity between the soul’s earthly and
aerial manifestations, so the emphasis on the conveyance of desire
here similarly underlines the importance of its aerial, purely “figured” existence as a stage in the soul’s progression toward its ultimate, perfect form.
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The parallel, indeed, extends further. For just as the earthly
body, as we saw, was prepared by the “virtute informativa” to receive a “spirito novo” that could only come from God, so there is
one desire that the aerial body is constitutively unequipped to manifest on its own. Even the blessed souls of Paradise, admitted into
the light of God’s presence, still await the fulfillment of this one
“disïanza,” which reveals both the epilogue of aerial existence as
well as the precise nature of the form into which it will finally deliver the “ripened” soul: the reunification with its human flesh.48
Significantly, the motif of ripeness infuses the entire great paean
that Solomon raises to this desire in Paradiso 14:
Come la carne gloriosa e santa
fia rivestita, la nostra persona
più grata fia per esser tutta quanta;
per che s’accrescerà ciò che ne dona
di gratuito lume il sommo bene,
lume ch’a lui veder ne condiziona;
onde la vision crescer convene,
crescer l’ardor che di quella s’accende,
crescer lo raggio che da esso vene. (Par. 14.43-51)

Like a “grateful” fruit into the sun, the soul will “grow” into its
complete form—a triumphant, inexhaustible growth, which Solomon fervently exalts as the very principle of the soul’s new existence, endlessly gathering and interfusing its faculties and the radiance of God’s love into the bliss of eternity (“s’accrescerà… // onde
la vision crescer convene, / crescer l’ardor… / crescer lo raggio che
da esso vene”).
What ripens through this growth, Solomon says, is the
wholeness of human personhood, “clothing” the soul again in the
mask of flesh and bones that first shaped it into existence. With
these words, another important parallel takes shape between the
beginning of that existence and its eventual fulfillment. We saw, in
fact, that the originary inspiration of the “spirito novo” into the
earthly body pivots on the incarnational role of the brain, an
For recent examinations of the importance of this desire in Paradiso, see Gragnolati’s
“Nostalgia in Heaven,” 136, and Experiencing the Afterlife, 149, as well as Jacoff’s
“Introduction to Paradiso,” in The Cambridge Companion to Dante, 107-24. Specifically in reference to Solomon’s speech, Byrnum further notes that “resurrection
was not merely the assertion of wholeness. It was also the object of desire. Even to
those schoolmen who imagined heaven as quiet and order, body was a beloved bride.
Solomon told Dante the pilgrim that we yearn for body, not only for ourselves but
also for those we love, in order that they may enjoy both God and their friends in the
flesh and that we may thus delight in God and in them” (The Resurrection of the
Body, 328).
48
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“organ” especially prepared (“organo assunto”) to equalize human
and divine constituents into the material, personified unity of the
soul. By designating the soul’s final form as a return to that same
unity (“la nostra persona / più grata fia per esser tutta quanta”),
Solomon also frames its reconstitution, therefore, as part of a process of spiritual and material synthesis, whereby the soul, as Dante
said to Hadrian IV, “matura / quel sanza ’l quale a Dio tornar non
pòssi.” And what visibly ripens in the aerial body, as the soul progresses through the journey of redemption (“mio pianger… / col
qual maturo ciò che tu dicesti”), so dramatically exemplified by the
encounter with Casella, is a transformation: the pure and immediate
embodiment, as the soul aligns with God’s “just” will, of the growing convergence between its “disiri / e li altri affetti” and “il sommo
bene.” Just as the brain originally “perfected” the flesh for its unification with the “spirito novo,” so in the aerial body visibly ripens
the form in which the soul, on the Last Day, will be ready to unite
with “la carne gloriosa e santa”—the restored and perfect immanence of God’s “divina bontà” in the “umana creatura,” present
without obstacle (“sanza mezzo”) in its bodily manifestation.49
In this way, the Commedia complements St. Anselm’s argumentation with a detailed and powerful vision of the immortality
of the body. And we are finally in a position to see how that vision,
within the poem’s framework, leads to a deeply consequential solution of the imaginative paradox that Dante ultimately set out to
confront. If the fullness of “our” personhood (“la nostra persona”),
in fact, consists in the restoration of the soul to the body—of the
transcending immanence of the soul’s form to the “humus” that
first shaped it into existence—then what ultimately ripens on the
scale of this new, divine and human wholeness, is the very state of
perfection in which God’s entire creation originated:
Forma e materia, congiunte e purette,
usciro ad esser che non avia fallo,
come d’arco tricordo tre saette. (Par. 29.22–24)

Beatrice’s words, in this perspective, perhaps finally begin to give
us a sense of what she envisioned, when she announced to the pilgrim the fulfillment of all human life (“vostra vita”)—a vision of
A similar analysis, it worth noting, accounts for the reunification of the damned
with their bodies. As Dante’s aforementioned reaction at the sight of Capaneo (“sì
che la pioggia non par che ‘l marturi”) and Caco’s raging words (“Ov’è, ov’è
l’acerbo?”) suggest, in fact, the lack of ripeness manifest in the absence of redemption
equally prefigures the fullness of damnation as the perpetuation (and intensification,
presumably), in the flesh, of the suffering experienced by the soul in its aerial form.
49
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immortality’s very essence, that is to say, ripening on the individual,
personified scale of human mortality. Of the perfection of all “unflawed being” in the human moment of the soul.
6. Conclusion
The Commedia concludes with another vision, that of God’s universal “knot” (“La forma universal di questo nodo / credo ch’i’
vidi,” Par. 33.90-91) and all of creation issuing forth from the “volume” of its eternal perfection:
Nel suo profondo vidi che s’interna
legato con amore in un volume,
ciò che per l’universo si squaderna:
sustanze e accidenti e lor costume… (Par. 33.85-88)

From the depth of this knot, as Dante watches, a human figure
gradually begins to radiate: “dentro da sé, del suo colore stesso, /
mi parve pinta de la nostra effige” (Par. 33.130-31). The final reckoning with the “sommo bene,” in other words, grants the pilgrim
a glimpse of that originary “resemblance” between human nature
and its Creator, to which the soul will be ultimately restored along
with its body. Dante does not describe this as his own “effigy,” in
fact, nor as Christ’s or any other particular person’s. In perfect pronominal correspondence with Beatrice’s reference to all human life
(“vostra vita”), all the poem reports is the appearance of “our effigy”—the individual semblance of every human being.
Would it be inaccurate, on these terms, to speak of the anthropocentric character of Dante’s poetic universe? This article began by asking what insights Dante’s idea of the soul may still have
to offer us “people of the Third millennium.” Despite its theological commitments, it has long been noted how the Commedia
achieves a unique imaginative “synthesis of the diverse elements
that constituted the contemporary cosmological picture,” orchestrating the structures of universe and human body inherited from
classical models towards “a full understanding of the order of creation.”50 Along similar lines, I sought to tease out the implications
of Dante’s imaginative commitment not only to the idea, but to
what Eugenio Montale called the “dignity” of our place in the
world:

Theodore J. Cachey, “Cosmology, geography, and cartography,” in Dante in Context, eds. Zygmut Barański and Lino Pertile (Cambridge: Cambridge University
50

Press, 2015), 221-327, 221.
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That true poetry has always the character of a gift and that it therefore
presupposes the dignity of those who receive it—this is perhaps the
greatest lesson that Dante has bequeathed to us.51

Would it be inaccurate, after retracing his confrontation with the
paradox of the soul, to speak of the gift Dante bequeathed to us as
a hard-won persuasion of the dignity of this most elusive, mortal
thing—human nature?
It is a question that I hope to leave open for further consideration. One can hardly presume to reach further into it, after all,
than Dante himself did when the vision of God’s knot, at last, overpowered him:
… ma non eran da ciò le proprie penne:
se non che la mia mente fu percossa
da un fulgore in che sua voglia venne. (Par. 33.139-41)

The pilgrim’s wings, perhaps, simply collapsed in the extreme leap
of desire. And yet (“se non che”) his mind also seemed to fuse, at
the very same time, with the lightning of revelation that struck it.
Perhaps it was no longer a vision he was unequal to speak of, as the
divine knot spun him round with “our effigy”—but a premonition
of what even Beatrice could only describe as the fullness of a human
“life”:
… ma già volgeva il mio disio e ’l velle,
sì come rota ch’igualmente è mossa,
l’amor che move il sole e l’altre stelle. (Par. 33.143-45).

My trans. (original sentence in the article’s epigraph) from Eugenio Montale,
“Dante ieri e oggi,” in Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Studi danteschi, 2 vols.
(Firenze: Sansoni, 1966), 333 (repr. as “Esposizione sopra Dante” in Prose 1920-1979,
vol. 1 of Il secondo mestiere, 2 vols., ed. Giorgio Zampa (Milano: Mondadori, 1996),
2668-90, 2690).
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